

Message Text

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ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-01 INR-07
L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15
USIA-06 ACDA-07 DHA-02 BIB-01 /068 W
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R 191515Z APR 77
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6434
INFO AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
AMEMBASSY BERLIN
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
AMCONSUL LENINGRAD
AMCONSUL MUNICH
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
AMEMBASSY SOFIA
AMEMBASSY WARSAW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 MOSCOW 5309

E. O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR PARM UR US
SUBJECT: VIEWS OF ZAMYATIN AND ZAGLADIN ON U.S.-SOVIET
RELATIONS

1. BEGIN SUMMARY. VIEWS OF TASS DIRECTOR GENERAL ZAMYATIN
AND FIRST DEPUTY CHIEF OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE'S INTERNATIONAL
DEPARTMENT ZAGLADIN, GIVEN ON SOVIET TV APRIL 9 AND RE-RUN
ON APRIL 17, PROVIDE A POSSIBLE INDICATION OF CURRENT
POLITBURO AND SECRETARIAT THINKING ON U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS.
IN COURSE OF 60-MINUTE PROGRAM, ZAMYATIN ASSERTED THAT
SOVIET POSITION ON CRUISE MISSILES WAS MADE CLEAR TO U.S.
DURING 1975 HELSINKI BILATERAL, ZABLADIN INSISTED THAT USG
WAS INTERFERING IN SOVIET INTERNAL AFFAIRS ON HUMAN RIGHTS,
AND BOTH MEN ARGUED THAT CURRENT USG APPROACH TO THE BILATERAL
RELATIONSHIP WAS ILL-CONCEIVED (ALTHOUGH BOTH WERE OPTIMISTIC
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ABOUT LONG-TERM PROSPECTS OF THE RELATIONSHIP). LOW-POINT CAME
WHEN ZAMYATIN GRATUITOUSLY CRITICIZED PERSONAL CONVICTIONS
OF PRESIDENT CARTER. END SUMMARY.

2. MODERATED BY TV POLITICAL COMMENTATOR AND SPECIALIST
IN U.S. AFFAIRS VALENTIN ZORIN, THE PROGRAM COVERED
GENERAL STATE OF U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP, SECRETARY

VANCE'S VISIT, AND RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SALT AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE. THE PROGRAM'S AUTHORITATIVE NATURE WAS INDICATED BY THE FACT THAT ZAMYATIN'S DETAILED COMMENTS ON THE U.S. SALT PROPOSALS AMOUNTED TO AN ADVANCE VERSION OF THE LENGTHY PRAVDA EDITORIAL OF APRIL 14 (MOSCOW 5123). IN ADDITION TO MAKING THE SAME POINTS AS PRAVDA, ZAMYATIN SAID THE FOLLOWING ON SALT:

--THE CRUISE MISSILE ISSUE WAS "ARTIFICIAL," CREATED BY THE U.S. ALONG WITH THE "FALSE" ISSUE OF THE BACKFIRE BOMBER. DURING ITS BILATERAL WITH THE U.S. AT THE 1975 HELSINKI SUMMIT THE SOVIET SIDE MADE CLEAR THAT IT COULD NOT AGREE TO THE UNCHECKED DEVELOPMENT OF CRUISE MISSILES WHICH, AS BRZEZINSKI RECENTLY ADMITTED PUBLICLY, WERE STRATEGIC;

--THE U.S. PROPOSAL REGARDING NEW WEAPONS SYSTEMS WAS "HYPOCRITICAL," BECAUSE AT THE VERY MOMENT SECRETARY VANCE WAS PUTTING IT FORWARD IN MOSCOW, A COMMITTEE OF THE U.S. CONGRESS WAS APPROPRIATING BILLIONS OF DOLLARS FOR JUST SUCH SYSTEMS (ZAGLADIN ADDED, WITH APPARENT SINCERITY, THAT THIS U.S. PROPOSAL RAISED A "VERY IMPORTANT" QUESTION OF TRUST IN THE WORD OF THE USG);

--IF THE U.S. IS PREPARED TO DISCUSS DISARMAMENT "REALISTICALLY," TO RETURN TO THE VLADIVOSTOK AGREEMENT, AND TO MAKE EQUITABLE PROPOSALS, THEN THERE IS NO REASON TO WAIT UNTIL THE MAY GENEVA MEETING TO CONCLUDE SALT II.

3. ON THE GENERAL U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP, ZAGLADIN TOOK THE LINE THAT:

--DURING 1976 AND EARLY 1977 THE U.S. CAUSED A CONFIDENTIAL

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STAGNATION IN THE RELATIONSHIP, AND RECENTLY THE USG TOOK A BACKWARD STEP WITH REGARD TO DISARMAMENT (A CLEAR ALLUSION TO THE VANCE VISIT);

--THE U.S. CAMPAIGN REGARDING ALLEGED HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN THE USSR HAS ITS "EPICENTER" IN THE WHITE HOUSE AND THE CONGRESS, AND CONSTITUTES "PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE" RATHER THAN "IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE" (AS THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION FALSELY CLAIMS) PRIMARILY BECAUSE IT INVOLVES ANTI-SOVIET ELEMENTS IN THE USSR WHO ARE ENCOURAGED AND SUPPORTED BY THE U.S.;

--BOTH ZAGLADIN AND ZAMYATIN TOOK AN OPTIMISTIC LONG-RANGE VIEW, HOWEVER, WITH ZAMYATIN QUOTING BREZHNEV'S LINE AT THE TRADE UNION CONGRESS TO THE EFFECT THAT U.S. SOVIET RELATIONS WITLL EVENTUALLY RETURN TO NORMAL.

4. ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SALT AND HUMAN RIGHTS, ZAGLADIN STATED THAT:

--THE U.S. DISARMAMENT PROPOSALS WERE EVALUATED ON THEIR OWN MERITS, BUT DISARMAMENT WAS A "DELICATE"

ISSUE REQUIRING TRUST; SO WHILE THERE WAS NO DIRECT
TIE BETWEEN THE TWO ISSUES, THE U.S. STANCE ON HUMAN
RIGHTS "OF COURSE" MARRED THE ATMOSPHERE;
--IN ZAGLADIN'S PERSONAL VIEW, THE CURRENT USG
POSITIONS ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND SALT WERE LINKED, IN THAT
BOTH REPRESENTED ATTEMPTS TO OVERCOME THE GROWING "INTERNAL
CRISIS" OF CAPITALISM IN THE U.S.

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5. A THEME THROUGHOUT THE HOUR-LONG PROGRAM WAS THE
"ILL-CONCEIVED" NATURE OF THE NEW U.S. ADMINISTRATION'S
APPROACH TO U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS. FOR EXAMPLE:
--IN WHAT WAS PROBABLY A NEW LOW IN SOVIET MEDIA
TREATMENT OF THE PRESIDENT, DURING A DISCUSSION OF TRUST
IN THE USG'S WORD, ZAMYATIN GRATUITOUSLY PULLED OUT A
COPY OF THE PRESIDENT'S CAMPAIGN BIOGRAPHY "WHY NOT THE
BEST" AND, WHILE THE TV CAMERA ZOOMED IN ON THE PRESIDENT'S
PHOTOGRAPH ON THE BOOK'S SLIP-COVER, ZAMYATIN CLAIMED
THE PRESIDENT'S BELIEF THAT U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
SHOULD REFLECT THE ETHICS AND HONESTY OF THE AMERICAN
PEOPLE WAS FUNDAMENTALLY CONTRADICTED BY HIS BELIEF
THAT ONLY THE U.S. WAS SUITED TO LEAD THE WORLD
(ZAMYATIN'S IMPLICATION BEING THAT THE SECOND BELIEF

WAS NOT SHARED BY THE AMERICAN PEOPLE);

--ZAGLADIN CHARACTERIZED THE U.S. PROPOSAL ON BANNING
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NEW WEAPONS SYSTEMS AS A PROPAGANDA PLOY THAT WAS
UNNMASKED BY GROMYKO (DURING HIS MARCH 31 PRESS
CONFERENCE), AND BRZEZINSKI'S SUBSEQUENT PRESS CONFERENCE
WAS AN ATTEMPT TO "ESCAPTE" THIS PROBLEM;

--ZAMYATIN ATTEMPTED TO PROVE THAT BRZEZINSKI WAS
INCONSISTENT AND INSINCERE IN HIS ASSERTION THAT THE
INITIAL NEGATIVE SOVIET REACTION TO THE U.S. DISARMAMENT
PROPOSALS STEMMED FROM THE FACT THAT THE SOVIET SIDE
HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO STUDY THE PROPOSALS FULLY: BRZEZINSKI
SAID THE USG DID NOT EXPECT THE SOVIET SIDE TO ACCEPT
THE PROPOSALS IN THREE DAYS, ZAMYATIN ASSERTED WITH A
SCORNFUL TONE, YET THE SAME BRZEZINSKI ALSO ADMITTED
THAT THE PROPOSALS HAD BEEN TRANSMITTED TO THE SOVIET
UNION PRIOR TO THE VANCE VISIT.

6. COMMENT. WE HAVE NO WAY TO KNOW PRECISELY HOW MUCH
OF A PROGRAM LIKE THIS IS PROPAGANDISTIC BLARNEY AS
OPPOSED TO A REFLECTION OF LEADERSHIP VIEWS. HOWEVER,
OUR READING OF SOVIET MEDIA TRENDS SINCE THE PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTIONS AND PARTICULARLY SINCE THE VANCE VISIT, PLUS
OUR GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE MENTALITY OF THE SOVIET
LEADERSHIP, LEAD US TO THINK THAT THE DISTORTED PICTURE
OF U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS PAINTED BY ZAMYATIN AND ZAGLADIN
PROBABLY IS CLOSE TO THE PRESENT CONSENSUS POSITION IN
THE POLITBURO AND SECRETARIAT. ZAMYATIN AND ZAGLADIN
ARE KEY FIGURES IN A POLITICAL APPARATUS WHICH STILL
TENDS TO VIEW THE OUTSIDE WORLD AND PARTICULARLY THE
U.S. IN TERMS OF IDEOLOGICAL STEREOTYPES. WHILE THESE
STEREOTYPES ARE SLOWLY BECOMING LESS RIGID, THEY STILL
CAN CAUSE AN ENORMOUS PERCEPTION GAP BETWEEN OFFICIAL
SOVIET THINKING AND OUR OWN. THE EVIDENCE AT OUR
DISPOSAL INDICATES THAT THIS GAP IS PARTICULARLY
WIDE AT THE PRESENT MOMENT.

7. THE FACT THAT THE PROGRAM WAS RUN TWICE ON SOVIET TV
REINFORCES OUR IMPRESSION THAT THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP IS
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DETERMINED TO DRIVE THE MESSAGE HOME, TO ITS DOMESTIC AS WELL AS
FOREIGN AUDIENCE, THAT THE U.S. PROPOSALS DO NOT PROVIDE
AN ACCEPTABLE BASIS FOR FURTHER SALT II NEGOTIATIONS.
IN THIS REGARD, PRAVDA HAS BEEN FOLLOWING UP ITS APRIL 14

EDITORIAL WITH REPLAYS OF FOREIGN PRESS COMMENTS,
AMERICAN ESPECIALLY, TO MAKE THE POINT THAT NOTWITHSTANDING
OFFICIAL AMERICAN OPTIMISM, THE SOVIET DO NOT CONSIDER
THE U.S. PROPOSALS IN ANY WAY ACCEPTABLE, BALANCED OR
EQUITABLE.
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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
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Control Number: n/a
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Sent Date: 19-Apr-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 01-Jan-1960 12:00:00 am
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
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